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Military Service and Future Earnings Revisited 
Muhammad Asali1 
Abstract 
Utilizing particularities in the Israeli laws and regulations, that exempt married women and ultra-orthodox 
Jewish men from military service, we provide evidence about the effects of compulsory military service on 
future earnings of veterans. The quasi-experimental estimates suggest that women experience a 4.6 percent 
military wage premium, while men experience a premium of 11.6 percent. These effects are far smaller than 
those experienced by minority groups, confirming the common notion in this literature. Finally, the 
discrepancies we found between the naïve and the consistent estimates suggest that people who voluntarily 
avoid service are those who face the highest opportunity costs of service.     
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Military Service and Future Earnings Revisited 
I. Introduction 
The growing body of evidence suggests that military service causes a loss in civilian labor market experience. 
The literature, however, is not unanimous about the net effect of service (Routon, 2014). It is possible that the 
benefits of military service more than compensate for the lost experience, providing a net positive effect on 
future earnings (e.g., Asali 2015). Moreover, serving members of minorities are likely to benefit more from (or 
be harmed less by) military service than their counterparts in the majority group (Hirsch and Mehay, 2003; 
Phillips et al., 1992; Angrist, 1990).  
Using evidence from Israel, this study sheds light on both issues.2 In particular, it uses law-induced random 
exemption from service to consistently estimate the effects of service for the majority (Jewish) group, and 
compares these with earlier findings for minorities. The exemption of married women from service is used to 
identify the effect among female workers; and the exemption of ultra-orthodox men is used to identify the effect 
among male workers. The decade of birth, proxying the changing attitudes towards early marriage, is used as 
an instrument for early marriage in the female regressions. The religiosity of the head of the household is used 
as an instrument for being ultra-orthodox in the male regressions. 
The study finds a significant effect of military service on future earnings of both male and female workers. 
Female workers experience a wage premium of 4.6%; male workers experience a wage premium of 11.6%. 
Comparing these findings with earlier evidence about the effects among Arabs in Israel, as shown in Asali 
(2015), it is evident that the effects experienced by minorities are much larger, and can be twice as large as 
those experienced by members of the majority group; an outcome that resonates with evidence from this 
literature. Finally, the evidence incidentally suggests that people who voluntarily avoid service are those who 
face the highest opportunity costs of service. 
 
                                                          
2 As argued in Kollias (1995), evidence from individual countries, like Israel in this case, can nevertheless contribute to 
the general understanding of an important question. 
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II. Data 
We use data from the Israeli population census of 1995, a representative sample that includes 20% of the whole 
population, covering Israeli citizens of all religions (Jewish, Muslim, Christian, and Druze). We limit our 
sample to workers with positive income, in the post-service, pre-retirement ages of 25-64. The main results use 
the Jewish population of the samples, but we also use a subsample of Arab women for one class of falsification 
tests. Table 1 reports summary statistics of the main variables used in this study.  
[TABLE 1] 
The table shows summary statistics for the whole sample of Jewish women, as well as for the subsample of 
“serving” women, defined as women who were not married at the official service age (18-19), and hence had 
to serve in the military by law. In the second panel, the table reports the summary statistics for Jewish male 
workers: for the whole sample and for the subsample of “serving” men, defined as men who are not ultra-
orthodox, and thus are not exempt from service by law. (An ultra-orthodox person is defined as somebody who 
attended a Yeshiva for at least one year; alternatively, we define an ultra-orthodox as somebody who attended 
a Yeshiva for five or more years; the results are virtually identical.) 
The average log hourly wage of a serving woman is 3.178, while that of a non-serving (early-married) woman 
is 3.090, yielding a gross wage gap of about 8.8%. The short specification of Table 2 for women shows this 
outcome as well. The respective figures for a serving man versus a non-serving (ultra-orthodox) worker are 
3.443 and 3.389, resulting in a gross wage gap of about 5.4%, as confirmed in the fourth column of Table 2. 
While the non-ultra-orthodox men are comparable to the whole sample of male workers, it is clear that early-
married women differ slightly from the general population of women workers: they are less likely to attain 
higher education, and they are older—this latter fact suggests that early marriage is more likely to be associated 
with earlier generations. 
III. Methods  
The Israeli law exempts early-married women (those who are already married at the age of 18-19, the official 
age of compulsory military service), and ultra-orthodox men (whose main occupation is to study the Torah) 
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from military service.3 We use these facts to identify the effect of military service on the future earnings of 
Jewish male and female workers. In particular, we estimate the following equation for the post-service (ages 
25-64) groups, separately for each gender, by OLS: 
ln 𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑔 = 𝑋𝑖𝑔𝛽𝑔 + 𝛾𝑔𝑆𝐸𝑅𝑉𝐸𝑖𝑔 + 𝜀𝑖𝑔,    𝑖 = 1,2, … , 𝑛;    𝑔 = 1,2 
where 𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑔 is the hourly wage of worker 𝑖 of gender 𝑔; 𝑋𝑖𝑔 is a vector of control variables that includes the 
age of the worker, the squared age, dummies for schooling categories, and dummies for marital status. 𝑆𝐸𝑅𝑉𝐸𝑖𝑔 
is a dummy variable that takes on the value zero if the worker is a female who married at or before the age of 
18-19, that is before service age (and thus did not have to serve); or if the worker is a male who is defined as 
an ultra-orthodox Jew and does not serve in the military (in our data this is proxied by whether he attended a 
Yeshiva or not; alternatively, whether he attended a Yeshiva for 5 or more years, or not). Otherwise, 𝑆𝐸𝑅𝑉𝐸 
takes on the value one. 𝜀𝑖𝑔 is the error term. The coefficient of interest is 𝛾𝑔 which measures the effect of 
military service on the earnings of men (𝑔 = 1) and women (𝑔 = 2). 
Since service, defined in the above manner, is a choice variable—i.e., a woman can choose to marry early, or 
a man can choose to become religious—the variable 𝑆𝐸𝑅𝑉𝐸 is likely to be endogenous, in that it is correlated 
with omitted variables in the error term. This renders the OLS estimates prone to bias. We, therefore, estimate 
the above equation by two stage least squares (2SLS) as well. 
The instrument for 𝑆𝐸𝑅𝑉𝐸 of females (i.e., early marriage) is the decade of birth year. This captures the societal 
and conventional changes in the cultural perception of early marriage, such that early marriage was more 
acceptable among earlier generations than contemporary ones.4 The instrument for 𝑆𝐸𝑅𝑉𝐸 of males (i.e., being 
ultra-orthodox) is the religiosity of the head of the household or his/her spouse, as measured by the years he or 
she attended a religious school. This discerns the tendency to religiosity that runs in families from that which 
is motivated by avoidance of service. That is, it captures the exogenous variation in being ultra-orthodox.  
                                                          
3 See Asali (2015) for a background and thorough description of these laws and regulations. 
4 Other forms of the instruments were used (like a cubic form of the decade of birth, or an early-marriage of the head 
of household or his/her spouse), and all produced similar results.  
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IV. Empirical Results 
Table 2 reports the main results of this study. The first panel provides estimates of the effect of military service 
for women, and the second panel for men. Under each panel, the first column estimates the main equation 
without any control variables, hence provides an estimate of the gross wage gap between the serving and non-
serving groups separately for each gender. The second column provides the OLS estimates from the full 
specification, and the third provides the 2SLS estimates. 
[TABLE 2] 
The gross wage gap between serving and non-serving women is 8.8%. The naïve estimate of the part of this 
wage premium that can be associated with military service is 3.3% as appears in the OLS column. The 
consistent estimate, as reported by 2SLS, is 4.6%. For male workers, the gross gap is 5.4%, but the consistent 
effect of military service on their wages, as appears in the last column, is 11.6%. These effects are statistically 
significant at all conventional levels.  
The downward bias of the OLS estimates is a sign that people who avoid military service do so because they 
are likely to face higher opportunity costs of service. The absolute bias being small, however, suggests that this 
avoidance activity is not of a major concern. 
As a falsification test, we estimate the main equation for Arab women, who do not serve regardless of their 
marital status. We find slightly negative but statistically insignificant coefficients of SERVE, like -.03 (SE .027) 
from OLS and -.04 (SE .031) from 2SLS, suggesting that the effects reported in Table 2 can indeed be attributed 
to military service. This test should be viewed with caution, however, since the very variable of early marriage 
can capture other cultural differences between Arabs and Jews that can themselves account for observed wage 
differentials. Also, discrimination in the Israeli labor market can mar such comparison (Asali, 2010). 
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V. Conclusion 
In a quasi-experimental approach, this study finds a statistically and economically significant effect of military 
service on future earnings of both male and female Jewish workers in Israel. These experience a wage premium 
of 11.6% and 4.6%, respectively. Comparison with earlier evidence on the effects of military service among 
Israeli Arabs shows that the benefits experienced by minorities are considerably larger than those experienced 
by members of the majority group—a finding that is in line with evidence from this literature. Incidentally, our 
evidence also suggests that people who voluntarily avoid service are likely those who face the highest 
opportunity costs. 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics  
 Women  Men 
 All Serving  All Serving 
Log hourly wage 3.143 
(.735) 
3.178 
(.726) 
 3.442 
(.756) 
3.443 
(.755) 
Age 40.37 
(9.698) 
38.59 
(9.751) 
 41.48 
(10.339) 
41.52 
(10.336) 
With 11+ years of schooling .839 
(.367) 
.891 
(.311) 
 .780 
(.415) 
.778 
(.415) 
With 13+ years of schooling .472 
(.499) 
.536 
(.499) 
 .407 
(.491) 
.404 
(.491) 
      
Observations 90,287 54,521  94,914 92,506 
Notes: Samples include Jewish workers aged 25-64, with strictly positive income. “Serving” for women 
is defined as a woman who was not married at or before the age of 18. “Serving” for men is defined as 
someone who is not ultra-Orthodox (with no studies at a Yeshiva). Standard deviations in parentheses.  
 
Table 2: The Effects of Military Service on Future Earnings 
 Women  Men 
 OLS OLS 2SLS  OLS OLS 2SLS 
Serve .088*** 
(.005) 
.033*** 
(.005) 
.046*** 
(.014) 
 .054*** 
(.016) 
.109*** 
(.015) 
.116*** 
(.016) 
Age  .048*** 
(.002) 
.048*** 
(.002) 
  .070*** 
(.002) 
.072*** 
(.002) 
Age2(x1000)  -.428*** 
(.024) 
-.433*** 
(.024) 
  -.678*** 
(.023) 
-.703*** 
(.023) 
Schooling and 
marital status 
controls 
No Yes Yes  No Yes Yes 
Constant 3.090*** 
(.004) 
1.338*** 
(.046) 
1.319*** 
(.049) 
 3.389*** 
(.016) 
1.045*** 
(.048) 
.980*** 
(.049) 
First-stage 𝑅2   .253    .913 
        
R-squared .004 .175 .175  .0001 .158 .151 
Observations 90,287 90,287 90,287  94,914 94,914 90,167 
Notes: The dependent variable is the log of hourly wage. Samples include Jewish workers aged 25-64, 
with strictly positive income. Robust standard errors in parentheses. The 2SLS estimator for women uses 
the decade of birth as an instrument for early marriage; the 2SLS estimator for men uses years of yeshiva 
studies of the head of the household or his/her spouse as an instrument for being ultra-orthodox. 
*** Significant at the 1% level. 
 
